NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration

By: Jim Hodges

When the parts of the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) splashed down in the Atlantic off Wallops Island on the morning of July 8, it signaled the end of one process that began three years earlier, when Mike Griffin, former NASA administrator, sketched his idea on a paper napkin in the cafeteria at Johnson Space Center.

And it signaled the beginning of another process that will end with, yes, paper.

In this case, it's a white paper that acknowledges all of MLAS' accomplishments, as well as its contributions to the Constellation program and to NASA.

"It will document how we built it, what the data was, all of that," said Mike Gilbert, chief engineer of the project for the NASA Engineering and Safety Center at Langley.

MLAS Chief Engineer Mike Gilbert: "We were having telecoms five days a week, three days a week, just to make sure that we had everybody talking. And if somebody had a problem, we needed to know it right now because we had to react to it." Credit: NASA/Sean Smith

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"We've got all of the flight data. We're still in the process of doing some of the analysis. The more (MLAS analysts) dig into it, the more things they find that interest them. And the deeper they want to go to understand those things."

The amount of data is voluminous and is the product of 173 of the 179 sensors on MLAS that worked during its flight.

"The whole instrumentation program performed beautifully," Gilbert said.

So did the pyrotechnic program, which produced the needed 16 explosions to separate parts, including a crew module test article from a fairing. And the parachute program, which involved successfully timing the opening of nine 'chutes.

The parachute program is part of the MLAS legacy, in this case conducted to benefit the Constellation program.

The MLAS project was conceived as a tested alternative to the existing Launch Abort System for Ares, NASA's next-generation human-rated space vehicle. From that, various other tasks were assigned to the program. In essence, the agency was seeking to maximize its $36 million investment.

Among the lessons learned from the project was the value of building MLAS in a setting out of the limelight. Listed as a benefit to NASA as a whole is "off-line nature of the project provides an opportunity to try and fail."

To forestall failure in a project measured in months, rather than the usual years, "the one thing we had to do was to make sure that we had communications all of the time," Gilbert said. "We couldn't wait to let something fall through the cracks.

"We were having telecoms five days a week, three days a week, just to make sure that we had everybody talking. And if somebody had a problem, we needed to know it right now because we had to react to it."

The design evolved during the process. Griffin's napkin-drawn vehicle and that drawn by Scott Horowitz based on from Griffin's art were altered when parts of the proposed vehicles were determined to be unworkable, at least within the timeframe allowed for MLAS. The rocket that went aloft from Wallops had those designs as its base, with a few concepts borrowed from various contributors, including the Russian Soyuz.

In the end, MLAS demonstrated that conservative analysis doesn't necessarily have to mean slow construction. Building it was anything but a slow process, taking just over a year.

Schedules were optimistic, but they were met because they were recognized as goals.

"We weren't going to do anything stupid," said Paul Roberts, while describing NASA Langley's contribution to the project. "We weren't going to do anything to jeopardize getting this data. But we were going to run to this goal."

In doing so, Langley built and delivered almost 30 tons of flight test articles for the project in 15 months.

It was the way MLAS was projected: fast-paced production toward a goal that was short-term on the calendar, but long-term in what could be achieved.

The white paper summary will include that. It also will show that contributions to the Constellation program included:

--An alternative to the Ares Launch Abort System already conceived.

--Aero-acoustic data on a faired capsule demonstration (the crew module on MLAS was inside a "fairing," or cover, during ascent, then separated for descent).

--Demonstration and data of the separation of the crew module and fairing and the parachute system.

Contributions to the agency included:

--Rapidity of the design, building and flight testing of MLAS.

--Data for future models.

--Hands-on experience for some veteran engineers.

--A next generation of engineers who got hands-on training on MLAS, along with guidance from a cadre from across the agency and a group of Apollo-era engineers.

That next generation was called the "resident engineers." It was a group of 10 selected from across the agency, and its members gave as much as they got.

"When they came in, they weren't quite sure what their role was," Gilbert said. "They weren't quite sure how much responsibility they were going to have. Especially after the first of the year, when they were really putting the vehicle together and they knew their hardware had to show up, they had a sense that 'I've really got to go and do this.'

"They really came together as a group. They became a team in themselves and part of the bigger team, also. And they really did bring a different perspective to the project."

And, he added, their energy could be contagious.

So was Gilbert's guidance. The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics' Hampton Roads Section named him its Engineer of the Year for his MLAS work,

"That was quite a surprise," Gilbert said. "I didn't even know that I'd been nominated. For the folks to put that together was gratifying."

After all, a team effort still has to have a coaching staff to be successful.


 
NASA Langley Research Center
Managing Editor: Jim Hodges
Executive Editor and Responsible NASA Official: H. Keith Henry
Editor and Curator: Denise Lineberry